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CONSTRUCTING A ROOF BEFORE THE
FOUNDATION IS PREPARED: THE RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
SECTION 2(b) DESIGN DEFECT
Frank J. Vandall*
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability section 2(b) is
a wish listfrom manufacturingAmerica. It returnsproducts liability law to something more restrictive than negligence. What is new
from the Reporters is that their proposal is written on a clean sheet
of paper. Messy and awkward concepts such as precedent, policy,
and case accuracy have been brushed aside for the purpose of tort
reform. There has been almost no attempt to evaluate strict liability
precedent or the policies underlyingprevious cases and the Restatement (Second) section 402A. Section 2b (the roof) has been drafted
with little considerationof the policies underlying section 402A (the
foundation) or the cases favoring the consumer (the support beams)
decided over the last thirty years. The Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability implies that legal analysis is farcical.Avoiding
legal analysis is certain to cause section 2(b) to lose convincing
power among those searchingfor solutions to tough cases involving
injuries caused by defective products.

As I look out of my office window, I am able to see the construction of a new building. First, the contractors excavate a
hole. Then they put in a steel rod and concrete foundation. The
floor, walls, and roof come after the foundation.
Over the last day and a half, something has been missing
from our discussion of the proposed Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability section 2(b)-the foundation. The
discussion has been comparable to deciding the size of the roof
to put on the completed building outside my window. It presumes that a foundation has been laid. It has not. To lay a
foundation for a Restatement there has to be a discussion and
critique of the policies underlying contemporary products
liability law. But the scholars at the Ann Arbor conference have
simply assumed that we need to replace current products
liability law (as expressed in cases and in the Restatement

Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. B.A. 1964, Washington and
Jefferson College; J.D. 1967, Vanderbilt University School of Law; LL.M. 1968, S.J.D.
1979, University of Wisconsin Law School. I appreciate the research assistance of Arlin
B. Kachalia. Mistakes, however, are mine.
*
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(Second) of Torts section 402A) because of the underlying flaws
in the policies (the foundation) on which it rests. This proposition is not self-evident. Before we replace the old law and old
policies with the new, we must first debate their continued
vitality. We have omitted this fundamental discussion. In its
place we have a new building-the Restatement (Third)of Torts:
ProductsLiability-thatwe may not even need. It is as though
the Reporters decided that an evaluation of fundamental policies would be too messy and time-consuming, so they just
skipped to step two, drafting a radically new definition of
design defect. As a result, they have failed in their attempt to
produce what might be called a Restatement.
Section 2 of the proposed Restatement has three key provisions. Liability may rest on a manufacturing defect (the product
is not like all the others on the assembly line),' a design defect
(the product in question is identical to all the other products on
the assembly line),2 or a flawed warning.3 The thrust of the new
Restatement is to limit strict liability to manufacturing defects
and to announce a new concept for design defect cases--"radical
negligence." Radical negligence means that to win a design
defect case, a plaintiff must prove that there is a "reasonable
alternative design" to the design selected by the defendant
manufacturer and that the manufacturer failed to exercise
reasonable care. I call the new standard "radical negligence" because it did not exist in more than three jurisdictions before
this draft Restatement4 and because it differs significantly from
"old fashioned" negligence. "Old fashioned" negligence is the
cause of action we all studied in law school. It rests on the idea
that a person may be negligent if he or she fails to exercise
reasonable care.
I have several observations regarding the draft section 2(b).
The proposed section does not represent progress. First, it
neither relies on nor furthers traditional products liability
policies; second, it does not accurately reflect the practice of
courts today; and finally, it does not benefit consumers.

1.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a) (Tentative

Draft No. 2, 1995) thereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2].
2.
See id. § 2(b).
3.
See id. § 2(c).
4.
Those jurisdictions are Alabama, Maine, and Michigan. See John F. Vargo, The
Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a 'New Cloth" for Section
402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a Different
Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 556 (1996).
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I. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY SECTION 2(B) IGNORES TRADITIONAL
PRODUCTS LIABILITY POLICIES

A. What Is a Restatement?

The traditional role of the American Law Institute (ALI or
Institute) Restatements, of course, is to restate the common
law. 5 The Institute founders were both critical of the legislative
process and admiring of the common law.6 The first director,
William Draper Lewis, stated that the goal of the ALI was to
parse "out of the mass of case authority and legal literature...
clear statements of the rules of the common law today operative
... expressed as simply as the character of our complex civilization admits."'
Historians may argue that the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A8 did not provide a true restatement of the common
law because it did not rest on case analysis, but that argument
is superficial. In fact, section 402A rests on well-established
reasoning. Professor Malone argues that historically all of tort
law rests on strict liability.9 The first reported case to adopt
strict liability was decided in England in 1466.1' This decision
was later followed by the famous decision of Rylands v. Fletcher" in 1868. Rylands involved the escape of water from a
reservoir and held that one who brings a non-natural substance
onto his land is strictly liable for damages when it escapes.' 2 In

5.
See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991) (noting that the
"restatements are drafted by legal scholars who attempt to summarize the state of the
law in a given area, predict how the law is changing, and suggest the direction the law
should take" and that the "restatement serves an appropriate advisory role to courts
in approaching unsettled areas of law'); cf Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third)
of Torts, Products Liability, Section 2(b): Design Defect, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 167, 196
(1995) (defending section 402A as accurately reflecting current law and policy).
6.
See Vandall, supra note 5, at 174 n.41.
7.
Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of ProductsLiability: The ALl Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 633 (1995).
8.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (stating that a seller of "any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user ... is subject to
liability for physical harm" suffered by the consumer).
9.
See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the
Common Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. REv. 1, 3 (1970).
10. Hull v. Orynge, YB. 6 Edw. IV Mich. f.7 pl. 18 (1466).
11. 3 L.R. 330 (Ex. Ch. 1868).
12. See id. at 332, 340.
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1944 in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 3 Justice Traynor
argued that strict liability should apply to the manufacturer of
an exploding soda bottle. 4 Justice Traynor's concurring opinion
in Escola rested on well-established legal concepts: negligence
and warranty law. 15 Traynor's opinion in Escola expressly
sought to avoid the continuation of the problems associated
with res ipsa loquitur and warranty.16 Escola reflected the law
of the time-strict liability for foodl 7-while also discussing the
available implied warranty action.' 8
Traynor's opinion also clearly explained the policies underlying
strict liability. His opinion stated that the manufacturer should
bear liability because it is the party best able to evaluate the
product, anticipate hazards, and make the necessary changes
or improvements. 9 Traynor also noted that the consumer may
lack insurance while the manufacturer can easily obtain insurance to cover the risk of injury. 2° Finally, he argued that the
manufacturer can spread the loss among the public, "as a cost
of doing business."2
Most importantly, Traynor took account of modern world
realities-that the consumer knows little about the design and
construction of the product and relies on the manufacturer to
ensure a product's safety.22 For example, compare the consumer
buying a station wagon today to a consumer buying a covered
wagon in 1850. When the consumer bought a covered wagon, he
might have helped the manufacturer build the wagon. But when

13.
150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
14.
See id.
15.
See id. at 441-43 (Traynor, J., concurring). Indeed, Escola can be seen as an
extension of the 1916 case, MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916),
which developed the theory that a plaintiff could sue in negligence and recover from a
product manufacturer without showing privity. See id. at 1054.
16.
Cf Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Cal. 1978) ("[Strict]
liability was created ... because of the economic and social need for the protection of
consumers in an increasingly complex and mechanized society, and because of the
limitations in the negligence and warranty remedies.").
17.
See Escola, 150 P.2d at 441.
18.
See id. at 442.

19.
20.

See id. at 440-41.
See id. at 441.

21.
Id.
22.
See id. at 443 (writing that the "consumer no longer has means or skill enough
to investigate for himself the soundness of a product" and that the consumer "has been
lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and

marketing devices such as trade-marks"). Traynor also made clear that often the design
and production process is secret. See id. This holds true today.
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the modern consumer buys a station wagon, she knows very
little about the design and construction of the product.
Traynor's concurring opinion was adopted as the majority
position in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,Inc.,23 when the
California Supreme Court held that strict liability applied to a
defective lathe. It is often said that Greenman formed the
foundation of section 402A.2 4
Another case, Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Mason
Supply, Inc.,25 though not a personal injury case, significantly
influenced the development and scope of section.402A. The case
involved cinder blocks that deteriorated in a lakeside cottage.26
The court held that an implied warranty extended to the consumer without a showing of privity.2 1 Prior to Spence, Dean
Prosser, the drafter of section 402A, thought that strict liability
would have very limited application. 28 Through Spence Dean
Prosser foresaw that strict liability would apply inevitably to all
products. 29 Accordingly, he drafted section 402A to apply to all
products.3 °
It came as a surprise then, to see over five hundred years of
tort cases put into the paper shredder at the suggestion of the
Restatement (Third)of Torts: ProductsLiability section 2(b). And
this decision came without any discussion of the purpose,
policies or success of these cases.

B. The TripartiteStructure of Section 2: Magic Boxes

1. The Structure of Section 2-The proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability section 231 divides all

377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
23.
24.
See RESTATEMENT CTHIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 reporters' note cmt b
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 1.1; see alsoVandall, supra

note 5, at 188, 193.
25.
90 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1958).
26. See id. at 874.
27. See id. at 878-81.
28. See Discussion of the Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, 38 A.L.I. PRoc.
87-88 (1961).
29. This is the author's recollection from lectures presented by Professors Prosser
and Wade at Vanderbilt Law School from 1964-1967.
30. See Discussion of the Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, supra note 28, at
87-88.
31. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2.
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products cases into three categories: warning defect, 32 manufacturing defect, 3 and design defect. 34 A warning defect exists if the
warning on the product is inadequate. 35 A manufacturing defect
arises when a product is flawed as the other products on the
assembly line are not.36 By contrast, products containing design
defects are precisely as the seller intended.3 7 The product with
a design defect is the same as every other product on the line.38
The Reporters developed separate subsections of section 2 to
limit strict liability's application to manufacturing defects. 9
They placed strict liability on the ice floe that is section 2(a) and
set it adrift.4 ° In the process, they drafted a section 2(b) that creates requirements more restrictive than negligence. To prove a
design defect under section 2(b) a plaintiff must show "radical
negligence."4 I call this standard "radical negligence" because

32.

See id. § 2(c). According to section 2(c):

a product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided
by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other
distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the
omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
Id.
33.
See id. § 2(a). According to section 2(a): "a product contains a manufacturing
defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care
was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product." Id.
34.
See id. § 2(b). According to section 2(b):
a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe.
Id.
35.
See id. § 2 cmt. h (explaining that "sellers down the chain are liable if the
instructions and warnings provided by predecessors in the chain are inadequate").
36.
See id. § 2 cmt. b.
37.
See id. § 2 cmt. c ("[A] product asserted to have a defective design meets the
manufacturer's specifications but raises the question whether the specifications
themselves create unreasonable risk.").
38.
See Vandall, supra note 5, at 176.
39.
See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. a; see alsoVandall, supra note
5, at 176.
40.
See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2 (applying strict liability only to
manufacturing defects). Manufacturing defects are rare and theoretically not very
important. See Vandall, supra note 5, at 176 n.52.
41.
At least one jurisdiction has rejected the reasonable alternative design requirement in negligence cases. See Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1987).
The Reporters are pushing for an approach that will encourage the production of more
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the plaintiff must prove more than negligence. He must prove
that a reasonable alternative design (RAD) was available at the
time of the sale of the product.
The broad language of section 2(b) may have subsumed "old
fashioned" negligence.42 Early drafts of section 2(b) strongly implied that the cause of action for traditional negligence had been
eliminated-that only section 2(b) was available as a cause of
action for defective design." At the University of Michigan
symposium, I asked Jim Henderson, from the floor, whether an
amendment to make certain that traditional negligence remained available outside section 2 would be considered later in
the year." Professor Henderson stated that this amendment
would not be considered at the May 1996 meeting of the ALI.4"
2. Section 2: The Practice-Assumingthat "old fashioned"
negligence is dead, plaintiffs harmed by defective products must
fit their claims within one of section 2's three magic boxes: the
manufacturing defect box, the design defect box, or the warning
defect box.
Separating defective products that belong in the manufacturing defect box from those that belong in the design defect box
will not be simple. In Pouncey v. Ford Motor Co.,46 the plaintiff
was working under the hood of his car with the motor running,
when a blade spun off of the car's radiator fan and hit the
plaintiff in the head.4" An examination of the fan blade disclosed
an excessive number of non-metallic impurities in the steel,

defective products, while the President is urging that at least one product, airplanes,
should be safer. The President, accepting the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security Final Report, said: "We will also change the way we inspect older
aircraft, to include an examination of wiring and hydraulic systems, all to ensure that
every plane carrying passengers, regardless of its age, is as safe as it can be." CNN
Special Event (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 12, 1997), available in LEXIS, News
Library, CNN File.
42.
"Old fashioned" negligence places on the plaintiff the burden of proving an
absence of due care, but does not require her to prove that a reasonable alternative
design was available as a condition precedent to suit.
43.
See Tentative Draft No. 1, supranote 24, at 30 ("The rules in this Section exclusively define the bases of tort liability for harms caused by product defects . . .
44.
See Frank J. Vandall, Remarks at the Colloquy on Products Liability: Comprehensive Discussions on the Restatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability 112 (Mar.
22, 1996) (transcript on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
See James A. Henderson, Remarks at the Colloquy on Products Liability:
45.
Comprehensive Discussions on the Restatement (Third)of Torts: ProductsLiability 112
(Mar. 22, 1996) (transcript on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
My feeling is that a motion delayed is a motion denied.
46.
464 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972).
47.
See id. at 958.
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known as inclusions.4 8 Arguably, the blade had a manufacturing
defect because it contained more inclusions than normally found
in the type of steel used to make the blade.4 9 On the other hand,
the inclusions could be a design defect because Ford had used
cheap metal in the fan blades, thereby causing the large number
of inclusions in the metal.50
Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Wisniewski" also shows the
difficulty in trying to categorize product defects as either design
or manufacture. As the plaintiff rode his Harley-Davidson
motorcycle around a curve, the clamp holding the throttle to the
handle bar disconnected. The throttle slid off the handlebar and
resulted in injuries to the plaintiff.5 2 The clamp disconnected
because a screw on the clamp had been cross-threaded on the
assembly line.5" Does this situation involve a manufacturing
defect or a design defect? It would be a manufacturing defect if
the assembly line robot malfunctioned and cross-threaded the
screw on the "C" clamp. On the other hand, it would be a design
defect if the robot was programmed so that every HarleyDavidson leaving the assembly line had a similar problem with
its throttle.5
The issue of whether a product had a manufacturing defect
or a design defect is important because if it is a section 2(a)
manufacturing defect, the plaintiff can sue in strict liability. If,
however, it is a section 2(b) design defect the plaintiff has to
show "radical negligence."5 5
Section 2's effectiveness hinges on the notion that it will be
easy to distinguish between a manufacturing defect and a design
defect. This belief reflects superficial analysis. As shown in the
Pouncey and Harley-Davidson cases, applying magic boxes to
actual cases will be challenging at best. At worst, it will divert
the court from the fundamental issue of whether the seller
should be liable for the defect.

48.
See id. Inclusions weaken the metal. See id.
49.
See id.
50.
See id. at 961.
51.
437 A.2d 700 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
52.
See id. at 702.
See id. at 703.
53.
54.
See id. at 703-04.
55.
See Vandall, supra note 5, at 176 & n.5. In practice, a radical negligence
standard will discourage many plaintiffs from bringing close cases.
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C. The Draft Lacks an Analysis of the Traditional
Policies Underlying Strict Liability

Geoffrey Hazard, the director of the ALI, justified updating
the Restatement in the Foreword to the Tentative Draft, stating
that "the Restatement Second of Torts has become out of date."5 6
Hazard or the Reporters must prove and support this bald
conclusion, especially because just the opposite conclusion is
more accurate. More than 3000 cases have cited section 402A,5 v
and no court has said that it reflects out-of-date policies or that
it needs to be rethought.5 8 Furthermore, no article or case states
that the decisions resting on section 402A have reached the
wrong results.
With no concern for the continuing validity of the policies
underlying strict liability, the Reporters began with a clean
sheet of paper (favoring the manufacturer) despite the fact that
the policy concerns underlying strict liability are long-known.5 9
The traditional strict liability policies have been set out as the
foundation to section 402A in comment c, which states:
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability
has been said to be that the seller, by marketing his product
for use and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a
special responsibility toward any member of the consuming
public who may be injured by it; that the public has the
right to and does expect, in the case of products which it
needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that
reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public
policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused
by products intended for consumption be placed upon those
who market them, and be treated as a cost of production
against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that
the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum

56.
Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 24, at xiii.
57.
See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1512 n.1
(1992).
58.
Perhaps the only exceptions are cases involving prescription drugs, which some
courts feel fall within comment k's exception for "unavoidably unsafe." See, e.g., Brown
v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 475-77 (Cal. 1988).
59.
Cf supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper
persons to afford it are those who market the products.60
These policies have significantly influenced, and remain the
foundation in the forty-four states that have adopted some form
of strict liability.6 ' As I read the Restatement (Third) draft,6 2 I
do not see evidence that the Reporters have challenged, debated,
weighed, or evaluated these policies. Because law serves as a
concrete statement of public policy, these policies must be
debated for the draft to succeed.

D. Section 8(c) Design Defects
in Drugs:A Tabula Rasa

The proposed Restatement (Third) distinguishes between
prescription drugs and other products. Section 8(c) of the
proposed Restatement (Third) provides:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe
due to defective design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in
relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits so that no
reasonable health care provider, knowing of such foreseeable
risks and therapeutic benefits, would prescribe the drug or
medical device for any class of patients.6 3
This proposal ignores the well-developed common law policies
regarding products liability:' the consumer lacks sophistication

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
that

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965).
See Vargo, supra note 4, at 553.
See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1.
Id. § 8(c).
See Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992). The Shanks court found

consistent with the purposes underlying strict products liability [are] that
manufacturers should be deterred from marketing certain products and that the
cost of the defense of strict products liability litigation and any resultingjudgments
should be borne by the manufacturer who is able to spread the cost through
insurance and by charging more for its products.
Id. at 1196.
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with regard to drugs;65 the loss should be placed on the
manufacturer;66 the seller/manufacturer can spread the loss;7
and the seller is the cheapest cost avoider. 8
The distinction between mechanical products covered by
section 2(b) and prescription drugs covered by section 8(c) is
artificial and arbitrary. The drug industry is not monolithic and
not all drugs and medical devices are worthy of blanket protection.69 Some drugs save lives, such as blood pressure medicine
and those that prevent infection, but others predominantly cause
damage, such as thalidomide, ° chloromycetin,7 ' MER/29, 2
DES, 3 or Oraflex.74 Indeed, several Oraflex consumers had been
killed in Europe before manufacturers introduced the drug in
the United States. 75 The Dalkon Shield, a medical device, caused
two billion dollars in damages.76
65.
See, e.g., id. at 1194-95.
66.
See id. at 1196.
67.
See id.; Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980).
68.
See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936 ("These considerations are particularly significant
where medication is involved, for the consumer is virtually helpless to protect himself
from serious, sometimes permanent, sometimes fatal, injuries caused by deleterious
drugs.").
69.
See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 100 (Utah 1991) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that "decongestants, expectorants, deodorants, hair growth stimulants, skin moisturizers, and cough and cold remedies, for example, [would] have the
same immunity as rabies or polio vaccines [and] medications essential in the treatment
of cancer, heart disease, or AIDS" and finding "no basis for according drugs used to treat
comparatively minor ailments a blanket immunity from strict liability if they are
unreasonably dangerous to those who use them (footnote omitted)).
70.
See, e.g., United States v. Bogusz, 43 F.3d 82, 89 (3rd Cir. 1994) (describing
birth defects caused by thalidomide during the 1960s).
71.
See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 655 & n.2 (Cal. 1973)
(stating that chloromycetin "has a history ofcausing aplastic anemia in certain patients"
and that many members of the medical profession consider it to be a dangerous drug,
if not "the single most dangerous antibiotic on the market at the time of [the plaintiffs]
treatment").
72.
See, e.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 413 (Ct. App. 1967)
(discussing eye opacities or cataracts as potential side effects of using MER/29).
73.
See, e.g., Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925 (noting that DES could cause "cancerous
vaginal and cervical growths" in daughters exposed to the drug during their mother's
pregnancy).
74.
See, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 863 F.2d 96,
99 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (describing the many dangerous possible effects, including death, of
taking Oraflex). After four months on the U.S. market, an estimated 50 deaths resulted
from Oraflex. See Teresa Moran Schwartz, PrescriptionProducts and the Proposed
Restatement (Third), 61 TENN. L. REv. 1357, 1396-97 (1994).
75.
See The Miracle Drug that Became a Nightmare for Eli Lilly, Bus. WK., Apr.
30, 1984, at 104. Eli Lilly obtained the FDA's approval to market Oraflex, although it
had not revealed "extensive evidence of adverse reactions and deaths related to the drug
overseas." Schwartz, supra note 74, at 1396.
76.
See Malcolm Gladwell, To Alan Morrison, Justice Falls Short in Robins Case,
WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1989, at Cl.
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The Reporters need to review a handful of very important and
recent drug design cases: Brown v. Superior Court,7 Kearl v.
Lederle Laboratories,7' Toner v. Lederle Laboratories,7 Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.,8 ° and Shanks v. Upjohn Co."'All these cases
articulate important concerns that deserve consideration. But
the Reporters never address the policies of Kearl, Toner,
Grundberg, and Shanks. 2 Instead, they take a clean sheet of
paper and virtually grant immunity to all drug and medical
device manufacturers for defective design cases. 3 Because of
these omissions section 8(c) is void of precedent." Most likely,
courts will not accept section 8(c) until the Reporters evaluate
the cases and the policies and draft a proposal that reflects the
law.

77.

751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). The Court wrote that

there is an important distinction between prescription drugs and other products
such as construction machinery, a lawnmower, or perfume .... In the latter cases,
the product is used to make work easier or to provide pleasure .... Moreover,
unlike other important medical products (wheelchairs, for example), harm to some
users from prescription drugs is unavoidable.
Id. at 478 (citations omitted).
78.
218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). "[We are uncomfortable with the rather
routine and mechanical fashion by which many appellate courts have concluded that
certain products, particularly drugs, are entitled to such special treatment." Id. at 463.
79.
732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987). Like the Kearl court, the Toner court rejected the
routine analysis that other courts have followed when granting drugs the comment k
exemption. "Courts must decide the applicability of comment k case-by-case .... " Id.
at 309.
80.
813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991). "We do not agree, however, with the Brown court's
apparent attempt to use the plain language of comment k as the vehicle for exempting
all prescription drugs from strict liability rather than relying on the policies underlying
that comment." Id. at 95.
81.
835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992). "[W~e find it speculative at best that restricting
strict liability design defect claims against prescription drug manufacturers will serve
the public interest by enhancing the availability and affordability of prescription drugs."
Id. at 1195.
82.
Cf Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 8 reporters' note cmt. f(outlining the
rationale behind section 8(c) without ever mentioning any of these cases).
83.
See Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 24, § 4. The Reporters stated: "Given the
very demanding standard that must be met before a case of defective design of a
prescription drug or a medical device can be established, liability is likely to be imposed
only under unusual circumstances." Id. § 4 cmt. f.
84.
Cf Schwartz, supra note 74, at 1378 ("[Tlhe standards for pharmaceutical
design claims depart dramatically from the status quo."); Angela C. Rushton, Comment,
DesignDefects Underthe Restatement (Third)of Torts:AReassessment of StrictLiability
and the Goals of a FunctionalApproach, 45 EMORY L.J. 389, 424 (1996) (asserting that
the "Tentative Draft approach to prescription drugs is a new position that differs
substantially from any case law").
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II. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY SECTION 2(B) DOES NOT REFLECT
CURRENT PRACTICE

A. What Does the Case Law Say?
The Restatement (Third)of Torts: Products Liability section
2(b) is not an accurate representation of the law. 5 It is simply
not a Restatement as we know it. The case law cited by the Reporters fails to support the design defect provision, section 2(b),
in key ways. First, with regard to risk-utility balancing, the
Reporters state, "An overwhelming majority of... jurisdictions
rely on risk-utility balancing," which the Reporters construe to
mean negligence. 8 The cases cited by the Reporters, however,
do not support risk-utility balancing as a subset of negligence.87
The judges in the majority of those cases believed they were
applying strict liability.88 Indeed, one authority suggests that a
majority of jurisdictions use a consumer expectations test, not
a risk-utility balancing. 9
Second, the Reporters cite case law in twelve jurisdictions as
proof that the reasonable alternative design should be a requirement,9 ° but a majority ofjurisdictions that have considered
the question have decided to the contrary. 9 In fact, contrary
holdings govern a total of fourteen jurisdictions. Some hold that
a reasonable alternative design is simply one of many factors to

85. See Howard C. Klemme, Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members of
the Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61 TENN. L.
REV. 1173, 1175 (1994) (asserting that Tentative Draft No. 1 is "demonstrably defective"
and that it requires "a more thoughtful, thorough analysis" of the relevant case
holdings); Vargo, supra note 4, at 536-37 (arguing that while the Reporters "have
expressed strong views on policy," their viewpoint "is not determinative of what the law

is").
86. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 24, § 2 reporters' note cmt. c.
87. See id.; Vandall, supra note 5, at 169-73.
88. See Vandall, supra note 5, at 169.
89. See Roland F. Banks &Margaret O'Connor, Restating the Restatement (Second),
Section 402A-Design Defect, 72 OR. L. REv. 411, 413-14 (1993). But see Vargo, supra
note 4, at 539 (stating that 10 states use the consumer expectations test).
90. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2, reporters' note cmt. c.
91. See Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
Section 2(b): The ReasonableAlternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407,
1413-18 (1994) (reviewing case law of Colorado, Kentucky, Nevada, New Hampshire,
and Texas which dictates that reasonable alternative design is one of several factors to
consider in determining if a design is defective).
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consider in the risk-utility analysis; 2 others shift the burden to
the defendant manufacturer to prove that the product was not
defective;93 and others do not require the plaintiff to present a
reasonable alternative design.94 Professor John Vargo's two and
one-half year study of the case law found that only three jurisdictions support section 2(b)'s thrust that a plaintiff must
present evidence of a reasonable alternative design.9 5 In this
450-page study, Professor Vargo examined the cases of every
state and concluded that only the common law of Alabama,
Maine, and Michigan support the Reporters.9" Another five
jurisdictions have adopted the reasonable alternative design
requirement by statute.9 7 A total of eight jurisdictions hardly
constitute a majority.
Third, the cases do not draw uniform distinctions between
manufacturing defects and design defects, as the Reporters
argued.9" Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.," an important California
case, stated that the distinction is not tenable; 0 and, Barker v.
Lull Engineering, Co.,' ° ' expressly refused to draw this

92.
Five jurisdictions consider a reasonable alternative design merely a factor in
the design defect analysis. See Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 & n.2
(5th Cir. 1985) (applying Texas law); Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1247
(Colo. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602
S.W.2d 429, 434 (Ky. 1980); McCourt v. J.C. Penney Co., 734 P.2d 696, 698 (Nev. 1987);
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978).
93.
Three jurisdictions shift the burden to the defendant to prove that the product
was not defective. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871,885 (Alaska 1979);
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp.
Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 739 (Haw. 1983); Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566,579
(Haw. 1989).
94.
Six jurisdictions do not require the plaintiff to present a reasonable alternative
design. See Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1457 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying
Oklahoma law); French v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295, 298 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying
Arkansas law); Oggv. City of Springfield, 458 N.E.2d 1331, 1338-39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984);
Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96-97 (Minn. 1987); Couch v. Mine Safety
Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585,588 (Wash. 1986); Sumnichtv. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,
Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2, 16-17 (Wis. 1984).
95.
See Vargo, supra note 4, at 536.
96.
See id.
97.
See id. at 537. Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, and Texas have enacted
statutes imposing the alternative design requirement. See 7 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-2104
(West 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.59 (West 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63
(1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75 (Anderson 1995); TEx. Civ. PROC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 82.005 (West 1986).
98.
See supra Part I.B.2.
99.
501 P.2d 1153, 1163 (Cal. 1972) (affirming verdict which held that a defective
hasp allowed bread trays to slam forward in a truck).
100. See id. at 1163 (refusing to distinguish between manufacturing and design
defects in order "to avoid providing.., a battleground for clever counsel").
101. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
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demarcation." 2 Fourth, the jurisdictions split evenly on whether
a seller should be charged
with knowledge at the time of sale
10 3
or at the time of trial.

B. The Restatement (Third) Section 2(b)
Design Defect May Be Rejected

A few states will probably adopt section 2(b). Perhaps
three-Alabama,0 4 Maine,0 5 and Michiganl-already follow its
principles via common law.'0 7 Forty-four states have adopted
some form of strict liability;' 8 only through policy analysis can
they be convinced that they were wrong. Undoubtedly some
states will adopt parts of the Tentative Draft. The Georgia
Supreme Court used the Tentative Draft to help it define a riskutility balancing test,'0 9 although it rejected making the existence of a reasonable alternative design a requirement for a
design defect claim." 0 The New York Court of Appeals, in Denny
v. Ford Motor Co.,"' demonstrated a different perspective on
products liability. In Denny, the plaintiffs Ford Bronco II rolled
over when she slammed on her brakes to avoid hitting a deer.
The plaintiff brought suit based both on strict liability and on
breach of implied warranty of merchantability." 2 Applying the
risk-utility test, the court upheld the jury's finding that the

102. See id. at 451-52.
103. See Vandall, supranote 5, at 179-82 (arguing that the Reporters have changed
strict liability theory into negligence theory by opting for the date-of-sale standard). In
Dart v. Wiebe Mfg. Inc., 709 P.2d 876 (Ariz. 1985), the court adopted the time of trial
approach. Id. at 881. Indeed, the Reporters cite four jurisdictions for the theory that the
manufacturer is charged with knowledge at the time of trial: Hawaii, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and Washington. See Tentative Draft No. 1, supranote 24, § 2 cmt. i. Cf
Ellen Wertheimer, UnknowableDangers and the Death of Strict ProductsLiability: The
Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1203 & n.71 (1992) (stating that "[ilf
knowledge of the product's danger is not imputed to the manufacturer, strict products
liability becomes a negligence doctrine").
104. See Beech v. Outboard Marine Corp., 584 So. 2d 447, 450 (Ala. 1991).
105. See St. Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1285 (Me. 1988).
106. See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 185-86 (Mich. 1984).
107. See Vargo, supra note 4, at 536.
108. See id. at 553.
109. See Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671,674 (Ga. 1994) ("[We see no reason
to conclude definitively that the two theories merge in design defect cases.").
110. See id. at 674-75.
111. 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y 1995), reh'g denied, 664 N.E.2d 1261 (N.Y. 1996).
112. See id. at 733.
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plaintiff could not recover under strict liability because the product was not defective." 3 The Denny court, however, upheld the
trial court's finding for the plaintiff on the breach of implied
warranty of merchantability," 4 applying the consumer expectations test. 115 In other words, the court concluded that there was
no liability for design defect because the Bronco II was suitably
designed for use as an off-road vehicle, but still found liability
under breach of implied warranty of merchantability because it
was marketed as a conventional passenger vehicle and did not
meet consumer expectations for such a vehicle."' Denny indicates that some courts, provided the opportunity to adopt section
2(b) of the Tentative Draft, will reject it and continue to follow
their own common law.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico has also rejected the
Reporters' approach in draft section 2(b). In Brooks v. Beech AircraftCorp.,l"' the plaintiff sued the aircraft manufacturer for the
wrongful death of her husband." 8 Plaintiff's husband died flying
a plane produced by Beech Aircraft. The plane was not designed
or sold with a shoulder harness. The plaintiff claimed that the
lack of harness enhanced her husband's injury, causing his
death." 9 Alleging a design defect, she sued in negligence and
strict liability. 2 0 After reviewing the policies behind the imposition of strict liability,'2 1 the court held that a plaintiff can bring
a design defect claim in negligence and strict liability and may
prove design defect without showing that the manufacturer did
not meet industry standards or government regulations.' 2 2 The
court thus rejected the Restatement's notion that only negligence
123
principles, and not strict liability, apply to design defects.

113. See id. at 735.
114. See id. at 739.
115. See id. at 736. The court said that the test for implied warranty is whether the
product is merchantable and that consumer expectations are a factor of merchantability.
See id.
116. See id. at 733.
117. 902 P.2d 54 (N.M. 1995).
118. See id. at 55.
119. See id. No government regulation or industry custom required the installation
of shoulder harnesses at the time the defendant manufactured the aircraft. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 57-58.
122. See id. at 55.
123. See id. at 62-63. The court stated:
In most instances a manufacturer is aware of the risks posed by any given
design and of the availability of an alternative design.... [Wie disagree with the
premise that fairness requires the rejection of strict liability in design cases ....
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III. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY SECTION 2(B): A PRODUCT WITH A
MANUFACTURING DEFECT THAT SHOULD BE REJECTED

A. Under the Restatement (Third),
Fewer Suits Will Be Brought

What impact will section 2 have on suits by injured consumers? Many suits for design defect, based on radical negligence,
will be lost because negligence is inherently harder to prove
than strict liability. 124 In addition, the courts likely will interpret
the reasonable alternative design concept as a condition precedent to suit or as a requirement for liability. 125 As a result,
plaintiffs will not bring many small suits or will see their suits
dismissed at the pretrial stage. For example, assume that the
cost of an expert or model to prove a reasonable alternative
design 12 would be fifteen thousand dollars, and the expected
verdict is forty thousand dollars. If courts apply section 2(b) in
that jurisdiction, the prospective plaintiff is not likely to bring
suit. Whatever the proof of reasonable alternative design might
cost, this new expense will affect dramatically the plaintiffs
attorney's decision regarding bringing suit. The plaintiffs in
small cases will not be able to afford the cost of producing
evidence of a reasonable alternative design, either in the form
of a prototype or as qualified expert testimony.

...

[We believe that it is logical and consistent to take the same approach to

design defects as to manufacturing flaws.
Id. at 63.
124. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972) (noting that
"the very purpose of our pioneering efforts in [strict liability] was to relieve the plaintiff
from problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence").
125. This result would mimic Florida, where the plaintiff in a medical malpractice
action must attach a certification that a medical doctor is willing to testify that the
defendant medical doctor was negligent. Without this memorandum, Florida courts
dismiss the case. See Bill Wagner, Remarks at the Colloquy on Products Liability:
Comprehensive Discussions on the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
137-38 (Mar. 22, 1996) (transcript on file with the University of Michigan Journalof
Law Reform).
126. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. e (describing how either a

prototype or qualified expert testimony would suffice for plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case).

278

University of Michigan Journalof Law Reforn

[VOL. 30:2&3

On the other hand, plaintiffs will continue to bring suits with
expected large verdicts because the outcome will justify the
1 27
expenditure necessary for the proof of an alternative design.
Language in Tentative Draft No. 2 suggests that the drafters
128
sought precisely this result: the elimination of smaller suits.

B. InstitutionalizingNeedless Ambiguity

One of the foundational goals of the Restatement (Third) is
clarity.129 A glance at section 2, however, reveals that the second
line of section 2(b) uses the word "foreseeable."1 3 By retaining
the concept of foreseeable risk the reporters have guaranteed
ambiguity under the Restatement (Third) section 2(b). This
ambiguity results in part from the fact that proximate cause, the
most challenging and ambiguous concept in tort law, also rests
on the concept of foreseeability.' 3 ' In addition, foreseeability is
an open-ended, discretionary decision made by judges and by
juries. Indeed, even the Reporters became confused over this
concept. In the Preliminary Draft, they argued that it was not
foreseeable that a person would stand on the back of a chair
with horizontal bars. 1 2 Soon thereafter, in the Council Draft,
they reversed themselves and found that
standing on the back
133
of a ladderback chair was foreseeable.
To better achieve their goal of clarity, the Reporters ought to
eliminate the concept of foreseeability. Remove it and erase it

127. See Vandall, supra note 5, at 190.
128. Cf Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. c (stating that the requirement
of a reasonable alternative design "imposes an important practical constraint in design
defect cases ....
[Seller/manufacturer] liability is not justified unless that added safety
[provided by plaintiff's alternative design] would have prevented or reduced the
plaintiffs harm").
129. See RESTATEMENT (THCD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILTY (Preliminary Draft No. 1,
1993), at 3 [hereinafter Preliminary Draft No. 11; see also Tentative Draft No. 2, supra
note 1, § 2 cmt. c (stating that the "confusion brought about by these various definitions
[of 'state of the art'] is unfortunate").
130. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2(b).
131. CompareIn Re Arbitration Between Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., 3 KB.
560 (1921) (holding defendant liable for all "direct" harms associated with its act), with
Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (finding defendant liable only
to foreseeably endangered plaintiffs). For additional discussion, see Frank Vandall &
Ellen Wertheimer, Torts, Cases, Materials, Problems (forthcoming Mar. 1997).
132. See Preliminary Draft No. 1, supra note 129, § 101 cmt. 1.
133. See RFSrATEMENT (THIR) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIAmmLrY § 101 ant p (Council Draft
No. 1, 1993).
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from the draft. They need to recognize that weighing factors,
alone, suffices as a workable test. Because balancing is already
an inherent
part of section 2(b), the addition of foreseeability is
134
overkill.

CONCLUSION

The treatment of design defect in the Restatement (Third)is
a political statement. It is not a restatement of the law and does
not rest on an evaluation of cases and policies. It exists merely
because it garnered sufficient votes.
The ALI can adopt whatever proposal it wants. What needs
to be made clear is that section 2(b) does not rest on case law
or articulated policy. It is therefore merely opinion and, as such,
entitled to as much respect as any other opinion. The ALI has
changed and so, apparently, has its mission. The ALI's mission
is no longer to restate the law, but rather to issue pro-manufacturer political documents.' 3' Although Congress was unsuccessful in changing products liability law in 1996136 to reduce
consumer rights, 3 v the ALI has succeeded.
Until an appropriate foundation is laid, jurisdictions will likely
reject section 2(b) of the Tentative Draft. There are three
reasons for this lack of acceptance: 1) the draft fails to address
the policies that underlie traditional strict liability; 2) it is a
woefully inadequate representation of the existing case law; and
3) it clearly favors manufacturers by eliminating strict liability,
skirting negligence, and adopting a radical new theory with
little attempt to balance the interests of the consumers. Perhaps
a word of caution is in order: buildings constructed without a
foundation often collapse.

134. See id.; Vandall, supra note 5, at 184-85. Indeed, Professor Oscar Gray suggests
that the real problem with insurability is not clarity of the law, but rather changes in
the law. See Oscar S. Gray, Reflections on the Historical Context of Section 402A, 10
TouRo L. REv. 75, 78 (1993).
135. Cf 64 A.L.I. PROC. 69 (1987) (remarks of Professor Walter H. Beckham, Jr.); Bill
Wagner, Reviewing the Restatement, TRIAL, Nov. 1995, at 46.
136. See Common Sense Product Liability ReformAct of 1996, H.R. 956,104th Cong.
(1996).
137. See President's Letter to Congressional Leaders on Product Liability Legislation,
32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 514 (Mar. 16, 1996).

